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CAMG Combat Support Axioms
Brigadier General Strom Thurmond, United States Army Reserve

This article supplements "CAMG
Operations in Atomic Age Warfare"
written by Brigadier General Strom
Thurmond and published in the Jan
uary 1958 issue of the MILITARY RE
VIEW.-Editor.
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primary objective of civil affairs
and military government operations
(CAMGO) is to provide CAMG combat
support. Toward this end, all energies, all
actions, and all thought must be focused.
For this reason, CAMGO personnel de
vote themselves to acquiring a more spe
cific, a more practical understanding of
the combat commander's needs and prob
lems and of the CAMG support that they
can give him to assist in accomplishing
fully the combat mission which has been
assigned to him.
Before proceeding it would be well to
decide what is meant by the term CAMG
combat support.
Referring to the Dictionary of United
States Army Terms, published by the De
partment of the Army in November 1953,
as Special Regulations 320-5-1, we find
that combat support is defined as: "op
erational assistance furnished combat ele
ments."
After considering also the definition,
therein, of such other terms as combat
element, tactical element, and tactical
troops, the following synthesis is sub
mitted:
CAMG combat support is CAMG op
erational assistance furmshed in a

combat operation. CAMG troops pro
vide CAMG operational assistance in
direct support of combat troops, and
are engaged under a combat com
mander, to operate as a part of his
unit in combat.
Communism
Another basic CAMGO objective is to
support and implement our national poli
cies. Foremost of these policies is to com
bat and neutralize Communist social and
political orientation of an area liberated
by military force from Communist control.
The combat commander, as the one per
sonally responsible for achieving CAMGO
objectives, must be fully cognizant of these
political military objectives of the Armed
Forces of our country. He is the one who
must constantly consider the human, po
litical, and economic aspects of the area
of his combat operations. The CAMG or
ganization at his disposal is the instru
ment with which he removes or neutralizes
all Communist influences in areas occu
pied by the military forces he controls.
Any neglect of this responsibility will
cause a vacuum quickly filled by Commu
nist oriented policy.
Of value in this connection is a little
known study of the three years of intensive
Communist CAMG planning and subse
quent occupation of a community entitled
The Reds Take a City: The Communist
Occupation of Seoul, by John W. Riley, Jr.,
and Wilbur Schramm, and published in
1951.
It is evident that our own CAMG plan-
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ning must include a full comprehension of
Communist CAMG planning. As a mini
mum, our CAMG planning must be di
rected at neutralizing the effectiveness of
Communist aggressive efforts.
Furthermore, we must be constantly
vigilant in our awareness that, as an in
strument of foreign policy, CAMG is for
us as it is for the Communists a weapon
for waging war. It is an adjunct to other
military weapons, perhaps, but, neverthe
less, an essential military accessory for
winning not only the war, but also the
peace.

Military versus Civil Authority
Still another basic objective of CAMG
operations is to provide for the early
transfer of responsibility from the mili
tary commander to a designated civil
agency of government.
CAMGO personnel are not engaged in
social or economic experiments or studies
for their own delectation or for academic
professional interest.
The CAMGO job is to get things done
as expeditiously as possible, to achieve
actual military operational objectives, and
to withdraw as soon as the military opera
tional need has been met.
The pace is quick, not leisurely.
It must be kept in mind that prolonged
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military occupation is not the task before
us.
Transfer to Civil Control
In order to facilitate the smooth trans
fer of control, civilian organizations un
der military supervision should be intro
duced early in the more stable parts of
the area of operations and gradually re
place specialized CAMG units and activ
ities.
It is a cardinal rule, though, that there
cannot be divided responsibility for the
control of an area. Either the civil or the
military authority must control the area.
The agencies of either, however, can be
used to support the other before and after
the transfer of control, which must be ac
complished smoothly, whether control is
being transferred from civil to military
authority or from military back to civil
authority.
Historical examples of civilian organi
zations which served under military con
trol are the United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA)
in World War II and the International
Cooperation Administration (ICA) in
Korea.
Such civilian organizations, under the
control of the theater army commander,
and in turn under the supervision of his
G5, definitely reduce the requirement of
CAMGO personnel. CAMG units replaced
move forward to augment the CAMG com
bat support units.
International Obligations
The remaining objective basic to CAMG
operations is to comply with international
treaties, agreements, or customary law.
For this reason, among others, there is
in the modern nuclear age army a fifth
general staff section concerned with all
military-civil. matters including the gov
ernment, economy, inhabitants, and insti
tutions in areas where United States
Armed Forces are employed.
This ensures that the combat commander
is properly advised of his responsibilities,
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of the limitations on his courses of action,
and of his capabilities deriving from polit
ical, economic, and societal factors.
In his estimates of the combat situa
tion, the combat commander carefully
weighs these civil affairs and military
government factors along with those deal
ing with personnel, intelligence, opera
tions, and logistics.
The combat commander's decisions are
influenced not only by his own and the
enemy's relative combat power and dispo
sition of forces, and not only by such fac
tors as weather and terrain, but also by
civil conditions in the area of his combat
operations.
CAMG Activity
The CAMG activity is not new to the
Army; only the organization of that ac
tivity is fairly recent.
Our CAMG experiences during World
War I, and the preceding foreign mili
tary engagements of our Armed Forces,
strongly indicated early in World War
II the urgency and importance of organiz
ing the CAMG activity that inevitably
accompanies combat operations.
The scope of the CAMG activity is vast;
the details of possible actions are numer
ous; and volumes could be written on each
functional segment of the CAMG activity.
Because generalizations often seem
vague, there is a need to search assidu
ously for clear, complete axiomatic state
ments to identify the elements of CAMG
activity.
Concrete definitions are needed, suffi
ciently comprehensive in scope and in con
veying understanding, of the practical part
performed by CAMGO personnel as an
operational element in the combat com
mander's organization.
Toward this end, axioms of CAMG com
bat support will be explored in an effort
to determine how to achieve the basic ob
jectives of CAMG operations previously
mentioned.
Were warfare conducted in an arena set
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apart, such as the jousts of medieval
knights, or as in many modern military
maneuvers on military reservations, the
combat commander could limit his con
cern to the factors of terrain and weather
and the dispositions of friendly and en
emy forces, their firepower, and capabili
ties. However, this is not the way it actu
ally happens on the fields of battle.
Wherever we fight there are people,
except perhaps in certain parts like the
interior of deserts, at sea, or in an arctic
r egion. It is because people interfere with
war and war interferes with people that
military commanders must consider the
effect on projected combat operations of
people, their actions, attitudes, institu
tions, and resources.
Combat Commander Responsible
Independence of action often results in
the belief that subordinates concerned with
particular CAMG matters are responsi
ble for CAMG operations.
This is far from true and we must re
emphasize again that the responsibility
for CAMG operations is lodged only in
the military commander of the area to
whom CAMG authority has been dele
gated, whoever he may be, and regardless
of whatever other concerns he may have.
The CAMG mission is part of the com
bat commander's mission. He must ac
complish it even without using the CAMGO
personnel and units specifically designated
and available to him.
The CAMG organization assists the com
bat commander as any other service as
sists him in its particular sphere, but he
is responsible.
Specially trained CAMGO personnel,
backed by CAMG organizations extending
from the front to the rear through all the
echelons of command, increase the combat
commander's CAMG capability many hun
dredfold.
And, what is equally important, the
combat commander is not compelled to
divert from combat tasks personnel whose
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special training and competence is needed
elsewhere to engage with the enemy.
Combat Element
It is the combat element which first con

tacts the civilian element upon the initial
entry of our Armed Forces into enemy
held territory. It is the combat commander
who first establishes the military control
which must later be transferred to a civil
agency.
The manner in which the people are
handled at this early moment by the com
bat commander determines their first and
most lasting attitude toward our Armed
Forces. That attitude may become actively
hostile or passively neutral. On the other
hand, that attitude may be cultivated to
become one of cooperation and, perhaps,
even result in active assistance to the op
erations of the combat commander.
In view of the tremendous drain upon
our own resources of modern atomic-age
warfare, it is essential that maximum
utilization be made of the resources, in
cluding manpower, in areas where our
Armed Forces are employed.
While it is true that international law
requires the combat commander to restore
and maintain public order and safety and
to provide for the well-being of the inhab
itants of an area coming under his mili
tary control, the combat commander can
do this in such a way as will contribute to
his combat success.
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taining public order and safety and provid
ing for the well-being of the inhabitants.
In the resulting climate of good will,
CAMG personnel, by working through
civil officials, can make labor available for
building military roads, bridges, ware
houses, bunkers, and other facilities. They
can locate and cause to be utilized for mil
itary purposes sawmills, stone quarries,
workshops, pure water sources, stockpiles
of construction materials, raw and proc
essed materials, and many other civilian
supplies, services, and facilities.
CAMG Weapon
In the search for weapons of greater
combat effectiveness, it is found that the
CAMG weapon, as an instrument of the
foreign policy of our Government, has
proved itself on many battlefields through
out the world. It delivers on the ground,
in the combat environment, an augmenta
tion of combat power-in terms of usable
resources---0f tremendous magnitude.
Every person, organization, and echelon
in the military structure, from the front
to the rear, is required to contribute to
the support of combat operations. This is
equally true of the CAMG organization,
and all CAMG actions must be directed
toward this common goal, even at the ex
pense, if necessary, of long-range rehabil
itation and reconstruction programs in
rear areas.
Personnel Competence

Conversion Process
The conversion of formerly enemy-held
territory to reinforce and even augment
the commander's combat power, in terms
of resource utilization, is a significant as
pect of CAMG combat support.
A paradox arises, however, in this
CAMG conversion process. In order to ex
ploit efficiently and effectively the resource
potential in support of combat operations,
it is not only necessary but also desirable to
comply with the provisions of interna
tional law regarding restoring and main-

It is of primary importance not only to

have the CAMG organization, as such,
but also to have the technological and pro
fessional competence of CAMGO person
nel brought to peak efficiency for func
tioning in the combat environment.
Because CAMG concerns primarily are
operational in nature, it is necessary that
CAMGO personnel be thoroughly grounded
in the various aspects of military science
and tactics. To perform their part in com
bat operations, CAMGO personnel must
have a comprehensive knowledge of the
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functions of the G3 section. Only in this
way can they understand how the G5 sec
tion plays its operational role in the in
tegrated staff of the combat commander.
The precept of Thomas Paine unquali
fiedly applies: "Where knowledge is duty,
ignorance is a crime."
It is the duty of every CAMG officer to
qualify himself fully as an alter-ego to
the combat commander, capable of con
tributing to estimates of the combat
situation and of participating in the for
mulation and implementation of combat
decisions.
Combat Support Tasks
The exploration for axioms of CAMG
combat support reveals that there are cer
tain actions which are conditional while
there are others which recur in all cases.
It may be concluded from this that CAMG
ccmbat support has two categories of
tasks-conditional and recurring.
Conditional tasks are such as arise out
of United States policy with regard to a
particular area and the limitations im
posed by the natural conditions of the
area.
Recurring CAMG combat support tasks,
on the other hand, may be defined, in gen
eral, as: gaining assistance and avoiding
interference of the inhabitants, their econ
omy, and institutions in areas where
United States Armed Forces are engaged
in combat.
More specifically stated, recurring
CAMG combat support tasks fall into six
additional categories:
1. Civil conditions.-Preventing and
suppressing disease, starvation, unrest,
and other conditions which derive from
combat relationships and which would
handicap or obstruct tactical and logistical
operations; and combating enemy efforts
to exploit such conditions.
2. Resource utilization.-Promoting the
availability and utilization of local re-
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sources, facilities, and services, and of
governmental, economic, and social agen
cies, for the benefit of the tactical and lo
gistical effort; and denying their use to
the enemy.
3. Civil security.-Assuring the secu
rity of combat troops from civil sources;
using public safety agencies· to eliminate
active and passive sabotage and guerrilla
activity; and coordinating civil defense
with military area security and damage
control operations.
4. International law.-Complying with
international law and agreements. This
includes provisions for restoring and main
taining public order and safety, for civil
ian relief supply, and for the care and
movement of civilian war and disaster
victims, such as casualties, refugees, evac
uees, concentration camp internees, dis
placed persons, and other needy persons.
5. Civil authority.-Reestablishing civil
authority; transferring the area from mil
itary to civil control; and providing as
sistance to established civil authority in
emergencies and disasters and, where in
dicated, in the routine conduct of govern
ment.
6. Military-civil matters.-Providing a
focal point for handling all military-civil
matters and, thereby, avoiding a diversion
of combat and other military personnel
from their primary military tasks by con
cern with civil as well as with military
civil matters.
Conclusion
This presentation is intended only to be
suggestive of the vast range of CAMG
combat support. A great deal of effort is
yet required to define in practical terms
all aspects of the CAMG capability to sup
port the combat commander's operations.
There must be a mutual understanding
on the part of combat commanders and
CAMGO personnel of the responsibilities
and capabilities of each in this increas
ingly vital field.

The Role of Ciuil Affairs and Military Gouernment
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer
Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army
The importance of CAMG outlined in the pre
ceding article by Strom Thurmond was under
scored by General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Vice
Chief of Staff of the Army, in an address to the
Military Government Association at its annual
conference at Augusta, Georgia, on !!5 October
1958. The MILITARY REVIEW presents excerpts
of the Vice Chief of Staff's address.-Editor.

BASICALLY, the role of civil affairs
and military government today may be
said to be unchanged from what it has
been in the past. Simply stated, that is to
relieve commanders of combat units of the
problem of administering the local popu
lation in the zone of operations; and be
yond that, to influence the civilian popu
lation so that their cities and facilities not
only cease to be liabilities but become as
sets. While the conditions which can be
expected in modern war greatly compli
cate this task, the task itself is in princi
ple the same obvious, basic one which has
always existed in war.
An important part of our chances for
success in any undertaking in the future
depends upon the soundness of the actions
which we take in the present. This fact
emphasizes the importance of some of the
major functions which are performed by
the Chief of the Civil Affairs and Mili
tary Government agency in the Depart
ment of the Army Staff.
In my opinion, the development of clear
understanding of civil affairs and mili
tary government functions throughout the
Army and the maintenance of CAMG
units which are ready to perform their
functions promptly in case of emergency
are of greater importance today than ever
before.
One of the characteristics of a nuclear
war would be a great expansion in the
area of the combat zone, with a corre
sponding increase in the number of people
who would be caught in the path of the
USA-CGSC-PU-1835-5 Dee 58-500

combat forces. Another pertinent factor
would be the mass hysteria which the use
of atomic weapons, or even the rumor of
such use, might well be expected to cause
in the civilian population of the combat
zone. Still a third significant point to be
noted is the greater tactical dispersion of
combat units which would prevail. Finally,
there is the fact that an atomic battlefield
would be marked by extreme destruction.
All of these characteristics combine to
intensify the importance of the civil af
fairs and military government role. If
ground combat units are to operate success
fully in a nuclear war-and their success
ful operation will be an essential element
of victory-they must be able to concen
trate rapidly from dispersed positions, to
strike swiftly in exploitation of their nu
clear strikes, and to disperse again quickly.
The emphasis in each of these phases, as
I have indicated, is on speed. But if the
roads and the countryside are thronged
with refugees it will not be possible to
move speedily, and it may not be possible
to move at all.
In short, in future operations, whether
or not atomic weapons should be used, the
responsibilities of civil affairs and mili
tary government will not only be no lighter
than they have been in the past, but in all
probability will be tremendously magni
fied. Therefore, we cannot sit back and as
sume that the organization and doctrine
to carry out these vital functions can be
created after hostilities begin. We must
make every possible preparation now, so
that in case of emergency the urgently
n_eeded steps could be taken promptly and
efficiently. This is a need which, I am
glad to say, is generally recognized and
which is being met by a continuing and
effective effort.

